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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Margarito Rodriguez timely appeals following his conviction for two separate 
counts of Sexual Abuse of Y.R. and S.T., after the district court allowed the prosecutor 
to proffer unsworn testimony at trial that was inconsistent with the witness' direct 
examination testimony. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Margarito Rodriguez was charged by Indictment with Lewd Conduct with a Minor 
Under Sixteen and Sexual Abuse of Child Under the Age of 16 Years of Y.R.; two 
counts of Possession of Sexually Exploitative Material, Lewd Conduct with a Minor 
Under 16 Years, Sexual Abuse of a Child Under the Age of 16 Years and Attempted 
Rape of C.S.; and Sexual Abuse of Child Under the Age of 16 Years of S.T. (R., pp.11-
15.) 
Before trial, Mr. Rodriguez pied to all counts involving C.S., but proceeded to trial 
on counts I, II and VI involving Y.R. and S.T (R., pp.136-137.) S.T was called to testify 
on the first day of trial. (Tr., p.222, L.17.) On direct examination, S.T. testified 
numerous times she had never seen her dad, Margarito Rodriguez, masturbate. 
(Tr., p.228, Ls.5-9.) S.T. reiterated her testimony when questioned by the prosecutor, 
Ms. Kallin. 1 (Tr., p.228, Ls.10-13.) Following a break requested by the State, Ms. Kallin 
asked S.T. whether they had met before and S.T. responded that they had. (Tr., p.229, 
L. 16 - p.230, L.24.) Ms. Kallin then asked S.T. whether she remembered being asked 
about seeing her father masturbate. S.T. shook her head no. (Tr., p.230, L.25 - p.231, 
1 It appears, at this point, Ms. Kallin began questioning S.T. instead of Ms. Voss, who 
was previously questioning S.T. 
1 
Prosecutor Kallin then asked S.T. whether she remembered talking to Kallin about 
to her father's bedroom and opening the door. S.T. responded, "Oh, yeah, yeah, 
yeah, yeah." (Tr., p.231 Ls.5-7.) Ms. Kallin questioned S.T. further and elicited ST's 
testimony that she went to ask her father if she could go to a friend's house. (Tr., p.231, 
Ls.21-24.) His door was open a little bit (Tr., p.231, Ls.22-24.) When she opened the 
door, she observed him take his hands out of his shorts and go into the bathroom.2 
(Tr. p.232, Ls.2-4.) She testified she could not see his genitals. (Tr., p.232, Ls.8-10 ) 
After a two day trial, Mr. Rodriguez was found not guilty of Lewd Conduct with Y.R., a 
Minor Under 16 Years, but was found guilty of Sexual Abuse of a Child as to Y.R. and 
S.T. (Tr., p.383, Ls.5-16.) The district court sentenced Mr. Rodriguez to a unified 
sentence of eighteen years, with three years fixed, for the offense involving Y.R. (Count 
II). (Sentencing Tr., p.423, Ls.7-11.) The district court sentenced Mr. Rodriguez to ten 
years in prison with two years fixed plus eight years indeterminate for the count 
involving S.T. (Count VI). (Sentencing Tr.. p.424, Ls.8-10.) On Count Ill (C S ), 
Mr. Rodriguez was sentenced to fifteen years fixed, life indeterminate. (Sentencing 
Tr., p.423, Ls.12-14.) On Count VII (CS), Mr. Rodriguez was sentenced to five years 
fixed and twenty years indeterminate. (Sentencing Tr., p.424, Ls.11-15.) On Count VIII 
(C.S.), Mr. Rodriguez was sentenced to five years fixed, twenty years indeterminate. 
(Sentencing Tr., p.424, Ls.16-21.) These sentences were ordered to be served 
consecutive to each other. (Sentencing Tr., p.424, Ls.23-24.) On Count IV (C.S), 
Mr. Rodriguez was sentenced to ten years fixed, twenty-five years indeterminate, to be 
served concurrently. (Sentencing Tr., p.424, L.3.) On Count V (C.S.), Mr. Rodriguez 
2 During questioning, S.T. testified he took his hands out of his shorts and went into the 
bathroom, but when asked what S.T remembers seeing her father do when he went into 
the bedroom testified he was putting his hands in his shorts. (Tr., p.231, Ls.5-7) 
2 
was sentenced to three years fixed and seven years indeterminate, to be served 
(Sentencing Tr., p.425, 8-15) The total sentence the district 
imposed was thirty years fixed with life indeterminate. (Sentencing Tr., p.425, Ls.10-
11.) Mr. Rodriguez timely appeals from the district court's judgment of conviction. 
3 
ISSUES 
1 Did the district court err when it allowed the prosecutor to testify during direct 
examination in violation of Mr. Rodriguez's due process rights and right to a fair 
trial? 
2. Did the district court err when it allowed the prosecutor to testify without allowing 
Mr. Rodriguez to cross examine her thereby violating Mr. Rodriguez's rights 
under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution? 
3. Did the district court err when it allowed the prosecutor to engage in misconduct 
by offering facts not in evidence by allowing the detective to give his opinion 
about what he saw on the video, State's Exhibit #19, to the jury? 
4. Did the district court err when it made improper comments on the evidence when 
it admonished the Jury to only consider the video and the narrative as it relates to 
the charge against the defendant involving S.T., thereby violating 
Mr. Rodriguez's right to a fair trial before an impartial jury? 
4 
ARGUMENT 
L 
The District Court Erred When It Allowed The Prosecutor To Testify During Direct 
Examination In Violation Of Mr. Rodriguez's Right To Due Process And Right To A Fair 
Trial 
A Introduction 
The district court erred when it allowed the prosecutor to testify, resulting in the 
prosecutor improperly impeaching a witness during the State's direct examination. This 
violated Mr. Rodriguez's rights to due process and a fair trial. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Because trial counsel did not object to the prosecutor's misconduct or ask for a 
curative instruction, Mr. Rodriguez must show the error is fundamental. State v. Draper, 
151 Idaho 576, 588 (2011 ); State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228 (2010). Error is 
fundamental if it: 1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional 
rights; 2) plainly exists in the record; and 3) was not harmless. Perry, 150 Idaho at 228. 
An error is not harmless if there is a reasonable probability that it affected the 
outcome. Id. at 226-228. 
C. Relevant Facts 
Prosecutor Kallin questioned S.T., during which Ms. Kallin testified about out of 
court conversations she had with S.T. (Tr., pp.222-232.) After introducing S.T., the 
State elicited S.T.'s testimony that she was there to tell the truth. (Tr., p.224, Ls.23-25.) 
Later, S.T. reiterated she would tell the truth. (Tr., p.225, Ls.1-2.) Ms. Kallin asked S.T. 
whether she knew what masturbation was, and S.T. confirmed she did. Next, the 
prosecutor asked her how a man masturbates, and S.T. accurately described it. 
5 
, p.227, L.25 - p.228, L 1-4.) S.T. denied seeing her father, Mr. Rodriguez, 
masturbate in front of her or other children who lived in the house. (Tr., p.228, Ls.8-13.) 
told the jury that she remembered her father calling one of the children away. 
(Tr., p.229, Ls.23-25.) S.T. testified she remembers one time she went to the room to 
see what was going on. (Tr., p.228, Ls.17-19.) She said her father was standing there 
in his boxers. (Tr., p.229, Ls.2-4.) She told the jury she did not see any body parts. 
(Tr., p.229, Ls.7-8.) S.T. told the jury she saw her father sitting on the bed, with her 
sister, C.S., standing near the door. (Tr., p.230, Ls.9-10.) She did not remember 
whether her father was clothed. (Tr., p.230, Ls.16-17.) At this point, Ms. Kallin stated 
that S.T. had told her in prior out-of-court conversations that S.T. saw Mr. Rodriguez 
masturbate once. (Tr., p.230 L.22 p.231, L.4.) S.T. indicated with a nod she never 
saw her father masturbate. (Tr., p.230 L.25 p.231, L.4.) S.T. admitted she told the 
prosecutor she saw her dad put his hands in his shorts, (Tr., p.232, Ls.5-7.) S.T. 
reiterated none of his genitals were exposed. (Tr., p.232, Ls.8-10.) During cross-
examination, S.T. testified she did not remember being interviewed by Mrs. Perry who 
worked with the Nampa Family Justice Center. (Tr., p.232, L.22 - p.233, L.2.) S.T. also 
testified that she remembered telling Mrs. Perry she had never seen her father 
masturbate. (Tr., p.233, Ls.3-5.) 
D. The District Court Erred When It Allowed The Prosecutor To Testify During Direct 
Examination In Violation Of Mr. Rodriguez's Due Process Rights And Right To A 
Fair Trial 
1. The Prosecutor's Testimony Was Misconduct Which Violated 
Mr. Rodriguez's Due Process Rights And Right To A Fair Trial 
While prosecutors have been afforded great latitude in argument, there are limits 
that, if exceeded, can constitute reversible error. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 470 
6 
U .1, 9 & n.7 (1985); State v. Page, 135 Idaho 214, 223 (2000); State v. Porter, 130 
786 (1997); State v. Martinez, 136 Idaho 521 (Ct App. 2001 ); State v. Priest, 
1 Idaho 6, 14 (Ct. App. 1995). Argument "may not misrepresent or mischaracterize 
the evidence," or "misrepresent the law or the reasonable doubt burden." State v. 
Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86 (Ct. App. 2007). The Supreme Court will set aside a 
conviction for prosecutorial misconduct when the conduct is sufficiently egregious as to 
result in fundamental error. Porter, 130 Idaho at 785. A defendant's constitutional right 
to a fair trial is violated when "a prosecutor attempts to have a jury reach its decision on 
any factor other than the law set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted 
during trial, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence." 
State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 452 (2012) (quoting Perry, 150 Idaho at 227). 
Fundamental error exists if the arguments are so egregious and inflammatory that 
prejudice could not be remedied by instructing jurors to disregard them. State v. Smith, 
117 Idaho 891, 898 (1990). 
Moreover, Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 3.7(a)("IRPC") prohibits attorneys 
from testifying in a case in which the attorney is involved. Specifically, IRPC 3.7(a) 
states: 
a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely 
to be a necessary witness unless: 
IRPC 3.7(a) 
1) The testimony relates to an uncontested issue; 
2) The testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services 
rendered in the case; or 
3) Disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship 
on the client 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has addressed the issue of prosecutors acting as 
witnesses by presenting unsworn testimony at trial but only from an evidentiary 
7 
standpoint In State v. Gerardo, 147 Idaho 22 (Ct. App. 2009), the defendants robbed a 
and were followed by a patron who saw them get in a car. Id. at 24. The 
witness (Mr. Ha) testified he did not see a fourth person sitting in the car. Id. at 26. On 
cross-examination, Mr. Ha admitted he had never told anyone at the prosecutor's office 
he had seen the perpetrators get into a car. Id. At this point the prosecutor interrupted 
cross-examination and stated in front of the jury, without objection: 
Id. 
I'll represent to the court and counsel that I interviewed Mr. Ha for the first 
time in my office in the last few days. I asked him, at that time, whether he 
saw or was in a position to see the persons who left the restaurant go into 
the car. And he indicated to me, at that time that he was in a position to 
see that. So, I had heard that before. I heard counsel ask him had he ever 
said that to law enforcement or a prosecutor. I was present when he told 
me a couple of days ago, Judge. 
The defendants later moved to strike the prosecutor's comment. Id. 
This description to the jury of the prosecutor's version of his discussions 
with the witness was improper unsworn testimony by the prosecutor. No 
person may testify in court unless first placed under oath. I.RE. 603. By 
contradicting Mr. Ha's testimony this way in front of the jury, the 
prosecutor, in effect, presented his own unsworn testimony in violation of 
this rule and in violation of I.RE 103(c). "In addition, it constitutes 
misconduct for a prosecutor to place before the jury facts not in evidence." 
Gerardo, 147 Idaho at 26 (quoting State v. Griffiths, 101 Idaho 163, 166 (1980)). 
The Court found the prosecutor's statement to be error, albeit harmless, 
reasoning: 
The prosecutor's statement in front of the jury is more troubling, but we 
conclude that it also was harmless. In cross-examining Mr. Ha, defense 
counsel was attempting to impeach Ha's testimony about the absence of a 
fourth man in the getaway car by emphasizing that Ha had not previously 
revealed this observation in his statements to the police or to the 
prosecutor. Gerardo asserts that the prosecutor's contradiction of Ha's 
cross-examination testimony rehabilitated this prosecution witness and 
undercut Gerardo's defense that although he may have been in the 
getaway car, he was not one of the gun-wielding perpetrators that entered 
the restaurant. We do not agree with Gerardo's assessment that the 
8 
prosecutor's statement diminished Gerardo's impeachment of Ha. The 
prosecutor did not contradict Ha's admission that he had never mentioned 
to investigating officers that he could see into the getaway car as the 
perpetrators entered it. Rather, the jury remained informed that Ha had 
not revealed this observation to any state agent until he met with the 
prosecutor days before trial. The impeachment potential of this 
circumstance, with the implication of some revision of Ha's story after 
speaking with the prosecutor, is equal to the impeachment value of the 
circumstance that was contradicted by the prosecutor's statement. 
Further, no actual evidence of the existence of any fourth man in the 
automobile was ever presented at trial. Gerardo's efforts to suggest the 
possibility that he was a fourth man solely by cross-examining police 
officers about their inability to see how many men were in the car was an 
extremely thin reed on which to predicate a defense. 
Id. at 27-28. 
The Court concluded because the prosecutor's statement had little effect on the 
outcome of the trial, it was harmless. It is important to note that the prosecutor's 
unsworn statement was made during cross-examination. and the court seemed to be 
swayed by the fact the statement was made in rebuttal to a defense. Id. at 27-28. The 
Court addressed the issue only from an evidentiary standpoint. 
Courts have addressed this issue in a similar fashion, only from an evidentiary 
standpoint. For example, in United States v. Puca, 436 F. 2d 761 (2d. Cir. 1971 ), the 
Second Circuit court found prejudicial error in the practice of a prosecutor placing his 
own credibility before the jury when he introduced a post-arrest, unsworn, out-of-court 
statement which implicated defendant, when questioning a witness. Similarly, in 
Roby v. State, 587 P.2d 641 (Wyo. 1978), the court reversed a conviction when a 
prosecutor presented unsworn testimony regarding a previous telephone conversation 
he had with a witness. The court stated "the prosecutor is, in a real and not too subtle 
way, presenting unsworn testimony concerning his part of the telephone conversation." 
Id. at 647. 
9 
Other courts have taken a broader view of this issue. For example, both 
and Kentucky examine this not only from an evidentiary standpoint, but 
as a violation of due process. See Dean v. State, 615 S.W. 2d 354 (Ark. 1981 ). In 
Dean, the prosecutor questioned an expert who evaluated the defendant. Id. at 355. 
The prosecutor elicited testimony that it was the expert's belief the defendant would 
very likely do this type of thing again. Id. at 355-56. After an objection and motion for a 
mistrial, the Court sustained the objection but denied the motion for a mistrial, instead 
admonishing the jury to disregard the prosecutor's question and the expert's response. 
Id. at 356. On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court decided the trial court should have 
granted the motion for a mistrial: 
The question by deputy prosecuting attorney Crowe did not simply seek to 
elicit testimony from the witness, but, in effect, made a clear statement of 
fact amounting to testimony by him under the guise of cross-examination. 
The statement by Mr. Crowe, a judicial officer, was made for the sole 
purpose of convincing the jury that if appellant were allowed to remain free 
there was expert opinion that he would again commit the crimes for which 
he was then on trial. This testimony by a court official was a flagrant 
violation of appellant's right to a fair and impartial trial as guaranteed by 
the Arkansas and United States Constitutions and was so clearly 
prejudicial that the error could not be removed by the trial court's 
admonishing statement. 
Dean, 615 S.W 2d at 356. 
Kentucky courts have adopted a similar analysis See Holt v. Commonwealth, 
219 S.W.3d 731 (Ky. 2007). In Holt, the prosecutor offered t~stimony from a witness 
who was in jail with the defendant. Id. at 733. Prior to the witness testifying, the 
prosecutor questioned him. Id. On direct, the witness denied the defendant admitted to 
the crime. Id. The prosecutor asked the witness whether he talked to the prosecutor 
that morning, and whether the witness told the prosecutor the defendant confessed to 
the crime. Id. The lower court overruled an objection, the witness answered the 
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question and the defendant was ultimately convicted. On appeal, the Kentucky 
Court overturned the conviction, stating: 
From the foregoing, it is clear that despite Bell's denial of the substance of 
the statements attributed to Appellant, the prosecutor asserted on at least 
four occasions that Bell told her that Appellant had admitted the crime. 
The Commonwealth rested its case without calling any other witness; 
there was no witness who impeached Bell's denial of Appellant's alleged 
statement. Nevertheless, the prosecutor stated in her closing argument, "I 
will say this and end it quick. The Commonwealth would never have 
wasted your time, if it had known what it was going to get out of Mr. Bell. I 
will move on." The effect of the prosecutor's questions asserting what Bell 
had said to her placed the prosecutor in the position of making a factual 
representation. From the tenor of her leading questions to Bell, there is no 
doubt that she put the very words Bell refused to say in his mouth. The 
jury was thus informed that Bell had told the prosecutor that Appellant had 
admitted the robbery. This placed the credibility of the prosecutor before 
the jury, and from the form of the questions, firmly represented to it that 
Bell had told her that Appellant had admitted the crime. 
Id. at 734. 
The Holt Court pointed out that courts in Kentucky have, for more than a century, 
rebuked prosecutors providing unsworn testimony disguised as examination: 
"[t]he conduct of the commonwealth's attorney was very reprehensible, 
and he should have been punished by a heavy fine. It is the duty of a 
commonwealth's attorney to represent the interest of the commonwealth 
fully and fairly, with his utmost ability; but it is not his duty to make a 
statement of fact, the credence of which is always more or less 
strengthened by his official position, outside of the record or evidence, 
which may tend in the least degree to prejudice the rights of the accused." 
Holt, 219 S.W.3d at 734 (quoting Commonwealth v. Cook, 7 S.W. 155 (1888)). 
The Holt court acknowledged other courts had rejected this practice: 
In U.S. v. Shoupe, [548 F.2d 636 (6th Cir.1977)], the prosecutor went on to 
ask the witness over seventeen questions incorporating the substance of 
his prior out-of-court statements. The court noted that it could "find no 
precedent sanctioning the recitation," and that [c]ourts have condemned 
this practice as cloaking potentially self-serving accounts of a witness's 
statements with the dignity and credibility of the prosecutor's office, 
(citation omitted), as increasing the probability that the jury will consider 
the statements as substantive evidence despite any limiting instruction to 
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the contrary, . . . and as bypassing, to the prejudice of the defendant, 
reasonable alternative measures to accomplish the same legitimate result 
736-37 (internal citations, quotations and footnote omitted) 
The Court then addressed whether the error was harmless. The Court 
acknowledged it was not, stating: 
[w]hen the prosecutor effectively became a witness and confessed guilt for 
the defendant as if the confession came from his lips, the error was 
particularly egregious. A confession is devastating evidence of guilt, but, if 
possible, its effect is elevated when the prosecutor becomes the 
defendant's voice. When that happens, the defendant's bundle of 
constitutional rights evaporates. 
Id. at 738. 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has previously addressed the subject of 
unsworn testimony given by a police officer, but not a prosecutor. See US. v. 
Ragghianti, 560 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1977). In Ragghianti, the Court examined the use of 
prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence rather than impeaching the 
witness. Id. at 1381. In Ragghianti, the direct testimony of the witness contradicted the 
government's theory and supported the defendant's alibL Id. at 1380. The government 
then called an F.B.L agent who testified, without objection, to statements the witness 
made which were inconsistent with her direct testimony. Id. The statements, as 
testified to by the F.B.I. agent, tenuously contradicted not only her testimony, it also 
contradicted the defendant's testimony. Id. The Court found "this was hearsay of the 
worst variety, incapable of being countered by direct evidence." Id. (citations omitted). 
The Court discussed the difference between the use of hearsay evidence as proof of 
substantive facts and its use merely for impeachment. 
There is, after all, a difference between a prior statement obtained from a 
witness by the police in the course of a criminal investigation, and 
testimony given under oath in a formal proceeding. There are several 
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reasons for treating such statements differently, all of which have been the 
subject of learned comment which need not be harrowed here . 
. . . Although the difference in the use of a prior statement for impeachment 
but not as substantive evidence may be subtle, it has been held that 
proper implementation of the rule requires an explicit admonition to the 
jury by the court at the time a prior inconsistent statement is admitted, and 
also an instruction at the close of the trial, that the statement may be 
considered only as bearing on credibility. And where in that case, as here, 
neither was done, the Bartley court held it to be plain error under Rule 
52(b) requiring a new trial despite the lack of objection to the admission of 
the prior inconsistent statement or any request by counsel for the defense 
thereafter to caution or instruct the jury with respect to the limited role of 
the statement. 
Ragghianti, 560 F.2d at 1381 (internal citations, quotations and footnotes omitted). See 
also State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 7 4 (2011) (explaining impeachment is that which 
is designed to discredit a witness, i.e., to reduce the effectiveness of his testimony by 
bringing forth the evidence which explains why the jury should not put faith in him or his 
testimony). 
In the instant case, the unsworn testimony was not introduced for impeachment but 
was introduced as evidence in the State's case-in-chief. (Tr., pp.230-231.) At the time 
of its introduction, no explicit admonition was tendered to jury. Moreover, no instruction 
limiting the use of the prosecutor's unsworn testimony for impeachment purposes was 
given at the close of trial. The Court's failure to provide such limiting instructions armed 
the jury with the ability to rely on the unsworn statement as substantive evidence to 
convict Mr. Rodriguez. 
2. The Prosecutorial Misconduct Is Plain On Its Face 
The second prong of Perry is met as it is clear from the record Ms. Kallin 
testified, without Mr. Rodriguez having a chance to confront and cross examine her. 
The prosecutorial misconduct in this case is plain on its face, and there is no reason to 
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believe that Mr. Rodriguez's counsel was "sandbagging" the district court by failing to 
and allowing the prosecutor to provide unsworn testimony. There is simply no 
strategic advantage that can possibly be gained by failing to object to, and to ask the 
court to disallow the prosecutor from providing unsworn testimony without cross 
examination. Therefore, the prosecutorial misconduct is plain on its face. 
3. The Prosecutorial Misconduct Is Not Harmless 
Mr. Rodriguez asserts that the jury's consideration of the prosecutor's unsworn 
testimony, during direct examination, is fundamental error because it affects "the 
framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process 
itself." Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307-308 (1991). Even though the Court in 
Gerardo concluded the trial court erred when it allowed the prosecutor to present 
unsworn testimony, because it violated Rules 103(c) and 603 of the Idaho Rules of 
Evidence, the Court also found the prosecution's actions amounted to misconduct, 
placing before the jury facts not in evidence. Gerardo, 147 at 26. However, the 
Gerardo Court neyer addressed the prosecutor's offer of unsworn testimony, in its case-
in-chief, to rebut a prior inconsistent statement by its own witness as a constitutional 
violation. 
Although the precise issue presented here has never been directly decided in 
Idaho, the error affected Mr. Rodriguez's entire trial. Prior to opening statements, the 
district court instructed the jurors in a way which empowered the jury to consider the 
prosecutor's unsworn testimony. First, the court appropriately told the jury that opening 
statements are not evidence. (Tr., p.168, L.25 - p.169, L.1.) Second, immediately prior 
to openings, the Court accurately told the jury "you must decide the case only on the 
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evidence received in court." (Tr., p.179, Ls.15-17.) These two instructions empowered 
jury accept any testimony introduced at trial, even if it was unsworn. During 
opening statement, Prosecutor Voss gave the jury an overview of the evidence that 
would be presented, telling jurors "you will also hear from the defendant's other 
daughter, [S.T.] She's 14 today. [S.T.] will also talk to you about seeing her father 
masturbate in front of her." (Tr., p.181, Ls.4-7.) Prosecutor Voss also told the jury they 
would hear from Canyon County Detective Michael Bryant, who would testify that the 
video in this case, State's Exhibit 19, revealed "[S.T.] comes into the picture, behind the 
step-daughter, and sees her father masturbating." (Tr., p.182 L.16 - p.183, L.5.) 
The preliminary instructions empowered the jury to consider the prosecutor's 
unsworn testimony. The State introduced Prosecutor Kallin's testimony during its case-
in-chief which was inconsistent with the witness' sworn testimony. The court never 
limited the prejudice by instructing the jury that the evidence referenced in the opening 
statement regarding this unsworn statement is NOT to be considered evidence at trial. 
Twice this improper testimony was referenced in the opening. Both times, the Court 
empowered the jury to consider unsworn, inconsistent testimony. 
The prejudicial impact of the prosecutor's improper testimony is borne out by the 
jury's questions. During deliberations, the jury returned with two questions, only one of 
which is relevant here. (Tr., p.371, L.6 p.380, L.11.) Jurors asked, "Instruction 32: Is 
inducing, causing or permitting opportunity, To witness an act of sexual conduct, 
sufficient cause to establish guilt on point 37 That is to say, if we conclude the victim 
did not actually see any sexual conduct, is point 3 satisfied for finding of guilt?" 
(R., p.230 (emphasis in original).) The Court, with agreement of the parties, told the jury 
to answer the question by reading the instruction. (Tr., p.381, L.4 - p.382, L.5.) This is 
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problematic for a couple reasons. First, Instruction 32 deals specifically with the 
allegation Sexual Abuse of a Child S.T The portion the instruction the jury had a 
question about states: "3 the defendant Margarito Rodriguez induced, caused or 
permitted S.T (D.O.B: 5/23/2000) to witness an act of sexual conduct." (R., p.217 .) 
Nowhere in the instruction were jurors permitted to convict Mr. Rodriguez if they 
believed he merely permitted the opportunity for S.T to witness sexual conduct. The 
jury's question illustrates, most profoundly, the error that resulted from allowing the 
prosecutor to offer unsworn testimony inconsistent with S.T.'s testimony. S.T. testified 
she never saw Mr. Rodriguez masturbate. This testimony, if believed, would require the 
jury to acquit Mr. Rodriguez of the charge involving S.T. The jury's question reveals the 
jury considered the prosecutor's unsworn testimony, in reaching its verdict. For the 
above reasons, Mr. Rodriguez's conviction for counts II, VI should be vacated 
11. 
The District Court Erred When It Allowed The Prosecutor To Testify In Violation Of 
Mr. Rodriguez's Rights Under The Confrontation Clause Of The Sixth Amendment To 
The United States Constitution 
A. Introduction 
The district court erred when it allowed the prosecutor to testify without allowing 
Mr. Rodriguez the right to cross-examine her. This violated Mr. Rodriguez's Sixth 
Amendment Confrontation Clause rights. 
B. Standard Of Review 
As stated above, because counsel did not object, Mr. Rodriguez must show the 
error was fundamental. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 588 (2011 ). Error is 
fundamental if it: 1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional 
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rights; 2) plainly exists in the record, and 3) was not harmless. An error is not harmless 
if is a reasonable probability that if affected the outcome. at 226-228. 
C. Relevant Facts 
The relevant facts are set forth in Issue I (c), supra, and are incorporated herein 
by reference. 
D. The District Court Erred By Allowing The Prosecutor To Testify In Violation Of 
Mr. Rodriguez's Right Under The Confrontation Clause Of The Sixth Amendment 
1. The Prosecutorial Misconduct Affected Mr. Rodriguez's Sixth Amendment 
Confrontation Clause Rights 
The prosecutor engaged in misconduct by offering testimony not subject to 
cross-examination and violated Mr. Rodriguez's constitutional right to confront and 
cross-examine witnesses against him. Mr. Rodriguez has a constitutional right to a fair 
trial before an impartial jury. U.S. CONST. AMENDS. V, XIV, § 1; IDAHO CONST. Art. I, § 13. 
Moreover, the Confrontation Clause provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with witnesses against him." U S. 
CONST. amend. VI; see also IDAHO CONST. art. I § 13. The right to confrontation is 
fundamental and has been incorporated and applied to state prosecutions through the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965). 
The Confrontation Clause only "applies to 'witnesses' against the accused-in 
other words, those who 'bear testimony."' Crawford v. Washington, 541 US. 36, 51 
(2004). The United States Supreme Court has determined that the Confrontation 
Clause is limited to testimonial hearsay. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 823-24 
(2006); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. If the statement is testimonial, then its admission is 
permitted only if the declarant is unavailable and the defendant has had a prior 
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opportunity to cross-examine the declarant Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59; State v. Hooper, 
1 139, 142, 176 P.3d 911, 914 (2007). Any declaration, affirmation, omission, 
nonverbal conduct made for the purpose of establishing some fact, qualifies as a 
statement The Supreme Court has not provided a comprehensive definition of 
"testimonial," but some guiding principles may be gleaned from that Court's recent 
decisions. Whether a statement is testimonial is determined by looking at the 
statement's primary purpose and its similarities to traditional testimony. Davis, 547 U.S. 
at 822. Testimony is defined as "[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the 
purpose of establishing or proving some fact" Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (alteration in 
original; citation omitted). Therefore, a statement is testimonial when "the 
circumstances objectively indicate that ... the primary purpose ... is to establish or 
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution." Davis, 547 U.S. at 
822. When no such primary purpose exists, the statement is nontestimonial and its 
admissibility is governed by state and federal rules of evidence, not the Confrontation 
Clause. Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011 ). The unsworn statement made by 
Prosecutor Kallin was introduced to prove past events, i.e. that S.T. said she saw 
Mr. Rodriguez masturbate, even though S.T. testified she never saw Mr. Rodriguez 
masturbate. Therefore it is testimonial. 
Further, while a statement does not have to be written or made under oath to be 
testimonial, the formality of the statement itself and the formality of the circumstances in 
which the statement is made are relevant to determine whether it was intended to 
establish some fact at trial. Davis, 547 U.S. at 826, 827; see, e.g., State v. Shackelford, 
150 Idaho 373 (2010) (the totality of the circumstances analysis considers "the formality 
of questioning and the extent to which the interview was similar to live testimony"). In 
18 
essence, a statement is testimonial when it is intended to be "a weaker substitute for 
testimony at trial." Davis, 547 U.S. at 828 (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
Here, the prosecutor's unswom statement was testimonial. Its reliability could only be 
tested by the crucible of cross examination. Here, Prosecutor Kallin offered testimony 
about statements purportedly made by S.T. Because Mr. Rodriguez did not have the 
ability to cross examine the prosecutor, the testimony implicated his Sixth Amendment 
rights. 
2. The Error Is Plain On Its Face 
The second prong of Perry is met as it is clear from the record Ms. Kallin 
testified, without Mr. Rodriguez having a chance to confront and cross examine her. 
The prosecutorial misconduct in this case is plain on its face, and there is no reason to 
believe that Mr. Rodriguez's counsel was "sandbagging" the district court by failing to 
object and allowing the prosecutor to provide unsworn testimony. There is simply no 
strategic advantage that can possibly be gained by failing to object to, and to ask the 
court to disallow the prosecutor from providing unsworn testimony without cross 
examination. Therefore, the prosecutorial misconduct is plain on its face. 
3. The Prosecutorial Misconduct Is Not Harmless 
Because Mr. Rodriguez did not object to the prosecutorial misconduct during 
trial, he bears "the burden of proving there is a reasonable possibility that the error 
affected the outcome of the trial." Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. Mr. Rodriguez asserts that 
there is a reasonable possibility that the prosecutorial misconduct affected the outcome 
of his trial. 
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As discussed in Issue I, supra, the prosecutor's unsworn testimony is structural 
error. Assuming arguendo, this Court determines it is not structural error, the error 
prejudicial. The prejudice is evidenced by the juror's question, asking, "Instruction 32: Is 
inducing, causing or permitting opportunity, To witness an act of sexual conduct, 
sufficient cause to establish guilt on point 3? That is to say, if we conclude the victim did 
not actually see any sexual conduct, is point 3 satisfied for finding of guilt?" (R., p.230 
(emphasis in original).) This question most profoundly shows that the prosecutor's 
unsworn testimony was considered for its truth by the jury. At each of the previous 
instances mentioned above (opening statement, the limiting instruction relating to the 
video, and the detective's narration of the video), the Court had the opportunity to 
ensure that the unsworn testimony be limited either by a limiting instruction or an 
admonition to strike the testimony from the record, but failed to do so. Mr. Rodriguez did 
not have an opportunity to confront or cross-examine Prosecutor Kallin. Allowing 
unsworn testimony by the prosecutor was not harmless because there is a reasonable 
probability the testimony was relied upon by the jury to reach its verdict, thereby, 
affecting the outcome of the trial. Therefore, the third prong of Perry is met. 
Mr. Rodriguez never had a chance to confront and cross examine Prosecutor Kallin and 
therefore, he is entitled to a new trial. 
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111. 
The District Court Erred When It Allowed The Prosecutor To Engage In Misconduct By 
Offering Facts Not In Evidence By Allowing The Detective To Give His Opinion About 
What He Saw On State's Exhibit 19, A Video, To The Jury 
A. Introduction 
The district court erred when it allowed the prosecutor to engage in misconduct 
by offering facts not in evidence by allowing the Detective Bryant to give his opinion, 
through a prepared summary, about what he saw on State's Exhibit 19, (the video), to 
the jury. This was prosecutorial misconduct which violated Mr. Rodriguez's right to a 
fair trial before an impartial jury. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Because trial counsel did not object to the prosecutor's misconduct or ask for a 
curative instruction, Mr. Rodriguez must show the error is fundamental. State v. Draper, 
151 Idaho 576, 588 (2011 ); State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228 (2010). Error is 
fundamental if it: 1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional 
rights; 2) plainly exists in the record; and 3) was not harmless. Perry, 150 Idaho at 228. 
An error is not harmless if there is a reasonable probability that it affected the outcome. 
Id. at 226-228. 
C Relevant Facts 
On rebuttal, the State recalled Canyon County Detective Bryant. (Tr., p.316, 
Ls.5-6.) Detective Bryant retrieved video files off Mr. Rodriguez's phones. He explained 
to the jury his qualifications and explained how he retrieves files from phones and 
computers. (Tr., p.316, L.22 - p.322, L.13.) Detective Bryant identified State's Exhibit 
12, a screen shot of two females in a doorway from a yet to be introduced video marked 
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as State's Exhibit #19. (Tr., p.328, Ls.14-16.) At this time, the district court admonished 
stating "You're about to hear a narrative and view a video recording. You are 
to consider the video and the narrative as it relates to the charge against the 
defendant involving S.T." (Tr., p.328, L.23 - p.329, L.1.) After this admonishment, the 
district court ordered the spectators to leave the courtroom, while Detective Bryant read 
a summary to the jury of what he saw on the video. The summary is as follows: 
The video begins with a shut door with two towels hanging on the door. 
Part of the camera appears to be blocked by a towel. There's a male in a 
white and red striped shirt who is naked from the waist down who's seen 
pulling on his penis and then he's looking back towards the camera. His 
hand and penis is visible and he is masturbating. He repeatedly puts spit 
on his penis. He moves to the other side of the room and appears to be 
masturbating but his hand and penis is not visible. The male opens the 
door and appears to motion towards someone. Begins masturbating 
again. He moves away from the door and a girl walks in and sets scissors 
on a desk and immediately leaves. The male opens the door wider. The 
girl comes back in and leaves and then is called back in again The male 
continues to masturbate and then another girl's head is visible behind the 
first girl. The male continues to masturbate. 
(Tr., p.329, L.24- p.330, L.16.) 
D. The District Court Erred When It Allowed The Prosecutor To Offer Facts Not In 
Evidence By Allowing The Detective To Give His Opinion About What He Saw 
On The Video To The Jury 
1. The Prosecutorial Misconduct Affected Mr. Rodriguez's Constitutional 
Right To A Fair Trial 
While prosecutors have been afforded great latitude in argument, there are limits 
that, if exceeded, can constitute reversible error. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 470 
U.S.1, 9 & n.7 (1985); State v. Page, 135 Idaho 214, 223 (2000); State v. Porter, 130 
Idaho 772, 786 (1997); State v. Martinez, 136 Idaho 521 (Ct. App. 2001) State v. Priest, 
128 Idaho 6, 14 (Ct App. 1995). Argument "may not misrepresent or mischaracterize 
the evidence," or "misrepresent the law or the reasonable doubt burden." State v. 
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Phillips, 144 Idaho 82 (Ct App. 2007). The Supreme Court will set aside a conviction, 
the conduct is sufficiently egregious as to result in fundamental error. Porter, 1 30 
at 785. A defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial is violated when "a 
prosecutor attempts to have a jury reach its decision on any factor other than the law 
set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during trial, including 
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence." State v. Adamcik, 152 
Idaho 445, 452 (2012) (quoting Perry, 150 Idaho at 227). Moreover, the requirement 
that the State must prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt is 
grounded in the constitutional guarantee of due process. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 
307, 309 (1979). This standard of proof "play a vital role in the American scheme of 
criminal procedure" because it "provides concrete substance for the presumption of 
innocence-that bedrock 'axiomatic and elementary' principle whose 'enforcement lies 
at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law."' In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 
358, 363 (1970) (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895). 
Fundamental error exists if the arguments are so egregious and inflammatory that 
prejudice could not be remedied by instructing jurors to disregard them. State v. Smith, 
117 Idaho 891, 898 (1990). To begin, Detective Bryant's summary shifted the burden of 
proving every element from the state. The summary relieves the state of proving 
whether Mr. Rodriguez was masturbating. Further, Detective Bryant's summary 
contains factual assertions fundamental to Mr. Rodriguez's guilt/innocence. For 
instance, in his summary Detective Bryant states the male "appears to be masturbating, 
but his hand and penis are not visible." This most clearly illustrates that the detective's 
summary introduces and requires the jury to accept as fact that which the summary 
itself reveals cannot be determined from the video. On three different occasions the 
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detective's summary states, as fact, the video shows a male masturbating. The 
was compounded when the district court told the jurors they could only 
this narrative and video as it related to the charges regarding S.T From 
summary, the jury is told that the male is masturbating. This is one of the essential 
elements of Instructions 32, defining sexual abuse of a child, S.T., which requires the 
defendant have intent to gratify his lust, passions, or sexual desire. (R., p.217.) This 
"fact" was never introduced in evidence, to the contrary, S.T. testified she never saw 
Mr. Rodriguez masturbate. (Tr., p.230 L.25 - p.231, L.4.) 
2. The Error Is Plain On Its Face 
The second prong of Perry is met as it is clear from the record Detective Bryant's 
summary introduce facts not in evidence, by presenting improper expert testimony, 
when he narrated the video. The error and prosecutorial misconduct in this case is plain 
on its face, and there is no reason to believe that Mr. Rodriguez's counsel was 
"sandbagging" the district court by failing to object and allowing the prosecutor to 
present improper testimony. There is simply no strategic advantage that can possibly 
be gained by failing to object to, and to ask the court to disallow Detective Bryant from 
narrating the video. Therefore, the prosecutorial misconduct is plain on its face. 
3. The Error Is Not Harmless 
As discussed above in Issues I and II, supra, the jury had a question regarding 
Instruction 32. (Tr., p.371, L.6 - p.380, L.11.) During deliberations, jurors asked the 
court, "Instruction 32: Is inducing, causing or permitting opportunity, to witness an act of 
sexual conduct, sufficient cause to establish guilt on point 3? That is to say, if we 
conclude the victim did not actually see any sexual conduct, is point 3 satisfied for 
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finding of guilt?" (R., p.230 (emphasis in original).) Instruction 32 deals specifically with 
allegation of Sexual Abuse of S.T. (R., p.217.) The jury's question ultimately turned 
on they believed that S.T. was the victim. testified she did not see 
Mr. Rodriguez masturbate and therefore was not a victim of sexual abuse. (Tr., p.23O, 
L.25 p.231, L.3.) Ms. Kallin's testimony, coupled with the court's admonition and 
Detective Bryant's summary, is the only evidence that S.T. witnessed her father 
masturbate. The jury, if it believed S.T.. would have to acquit Mr. Rodriguez of the 
charge involving S.T. By convicting Mr. Rodriguez under Instruction 32, the jury had to 
believe Detective Bryant's summary instead of S.T.'s testimony. Therefore, as it spoke 
directly to one of the elements of the offense, the detective's testimony influenced the 
jury's verdict. Moreover, as Ms. Kallin's testimony addressed one of the elements of the 
offense, it improperly shifted the burden of proving Mr. Rodriguez guilty away from the 
state. The Supreme Court in Ellington recognized "'[e]xpert testimony that concerns 
conclusions or opinions that the average juror is qualified to draw from the facts utilizing 
the juror's common sense and normal experience is inadmissible."' 151 Idaho at 66 
(quoting Chapman v. Chapman, 147 Idaho 756, 760 (2009)). Therefore, 
Mr. Rodriguez's conviction should be vacated. 
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IV 
The District Court Erred When It Made Improper Comments On The Evidence When It 
Admonished The Jury To Only Consider The Video (State's Exhibit 19) And The 
Narrative As It Related To The Charge Against Mr. Rodriguez Involving S.T., Thereby 
Violating Mr. Rodriguez's Right To A Fair Trial Before An Impartial Jury 
A Introduction 
The district court erred when it made improper comments on the evidence by 
improperly admonishing the jury, which violated Mr. Rodriguez's due process rights by 
denying him his right to a fair trial before an impartial jury. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Because counsel did not object to the district court's admonition, it is subject to 
fundamental error review. State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 442 (2007). To constitute 
fundamental error, the appellant must show that the error: (1) affected one of his 
unwaived constitutional rights; (2) was clear from the face of the record; and (3) 
prejudiced him State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,226 (2010). 
C. Relevant Facts 
The facts, as they are stated in Issue Ill (C) are incorporated herein by 
reference. 
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D The District Court Erred When It Made Improper Comments On The Evidence 
When It Admonished The Jury To Only Consider The Video (State's Exhibit 1 9) 
And The Narrative As It Relates To The Charge Against Mr. Rodriguez Involving 
S.T., Thereby Violating Mr. Rodriguez's Right To A Fair Trial Before An Impartial 
Jury 
1. The District Court's Error Affected Mr. Rodriguez's Right To A Fair Trial 
Before An Impartial Jury 
This district court's admonition was a comment on the evidence. A jury can 
become biased as a result of comments by the district court: "Remarks or comments by 
a trial judge which would tend to prejudice either of the parties to a jury trial are 
proscribed because of the great possibility that such an expression will influence the 
jurors." State v. White, 97 Idaho 708, 711-12 (1976). Moreover, the requirement that 
the State must prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt is grounded 
in the constitutional guarantee of due process. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 309 
(1979). This standard of proof "play a vital role in the American scheme of criminal 
procedure" because it "provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence-
that bedrock 'axiomatic and elementary' principle whose 'enforcement lies at the 
foundation of the administration of our criminal law."' In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 
(1970) (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895). To begin, the district 
court's comment that jurors were only to consider the video and Detective's Bryant's 
narrative as it related to the charges involving S.T. shifted the burden of proving every 
element from the State. The district court's comments relieve the State of proving 
whether Mr. Rodriguez was in the video and whether it was S.T. who was in the video. 
Further, it poses a great possibility of influencing the jurors. The only conclusion the 
jury can reach after the court's admonition is that S.T. is one of the girls in the video 
(State's Exhibit 19). Moreover, the district court's admonition conveyed to the jurors 
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that S.T!s testimony was not credible. That is, S.T. testified she did not see her father 
masturbate. Detective Bryant's summary the video arguably reflects otherwise. It is 
jury, not the district who determines the credibility of witness testimony. It s 
also the jury, not the district court, who determines whether S.T. is in the video and 
whether Mr. Rodriguez induced, causing or permitted S.T. to witness an act of sexual 
conduct 
2. The Error Is Plain On Its Face 
The error in this case is plain on its face, and there is no reason to believe that 
Mr. Rodriguez's counsel was "sandbagging" by failing to object to the district court's 
improper comment on the evidence by telling jurors the video and narrative only related 
to the charge involving S.T. There is simply no strategic advantage that can possibly be 
gained by failing to object to the court's improper comment on the evidence. Therefore, 
the error is plain on its face. 
3. The Error Is Not Harmless 
The prejudice resulting from the district court's improper comment on the 
evidence is shown by the jury's question. The jury had a question regarding Instruction 
32. (Tr., p.371, L6 - p.380, L 11.) During deliberations, jurors asked the court, 
"Instruction 32: Is inducing, causing or permitting opportunity, to witness an act of 
sexual conduct, sufficient cause to establish guilt on point 3? That is to say, if we 
conclude the victim did not actually see any sexual conduct, is point 3 satisfied for 
finding of guilt?" (R, p.230 (emphasis in original).) Instruction 32 deals specifically with 
the allegation of sexual abuse of S.T (R., p.217.) The jury's question ultimately turned 
on whether they believed that S.T was the victim. S.T, in her testimony, told the jury 
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did not see Mr. Rodriguez masturbate and therefore was not a victim of sexual 
, p.230, L.25 - p.231, L.3.) Ms. Kallin's testimony, coupled with the Court's 
and Detective Bryant's summary, is the only evidence that S witnessed 
her father masturbate. The jury, if it believed S.T., would acquit Mr. Rodriguez of the 
charge involving S.T. By convicting Mr. Rodriguez, the jury had to believe the Court's 
admonition instead of S.T.'s testimony. Therefore, as it spoke directly to one of the 
elements of the offense, the district court's admonition influenced the jury. Moreover, as 
the district court's comment addressed an essential element of the offense, it shifted the 
burden of proving Mr. Rodriguez guilty away from the State. As such, the district court's 
statement impacted Mr. Rodriguez's constitutional right to a fair trial before an impartial 
jury. See White, 97 Idaho at 711-12 
Further, the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that when the district court 
comments on evidence, there is prejudice since there is ·'the great possibility that such 
an expression will influence the jurors." White, 97 Idaho at 711-12. That conclusion is 
evident from the record in this case. Therefore, there is a reasonable possibility that the 
jurors, being influenced by the district court's statement that the video is only to be 
considered against Mr. Rodriguez for charges involving S.T., abandoned their otherwise 
reasonable doubt as to whether the State had proved all the elements of the offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt. As such, the error prejudiced Mr. Rodriguez, and the 
district court's comment on the evidence constituted fundamental error. Thus, the 
resulting conviction should be vacated. 
29 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons explained above this Court should vacate Mr. Rodriguez's 
and remand to district court for further proceedings. 
DATED this 20 th day of October, 2015. 
AARON J. CURRIN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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